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6 May 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN





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State Dept. review completed

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25X1	Libya: The reorganization of Prime Minister Uthman's cabinet on 4 May appears aimed at heading off a new governmental crisis over graft and corruption among top officials. Members of the Uthman government have in their six months of power managed to find "legal" as well as sub rosa means for extracting large sums from several Western-owned oil companies. Although the pro-Western minister of foreign affairs has been replaced by an experienced diplomat who has also been favorably disposed toward the West, the composition of the revised cabinet as a whole suggests a continuation of the gradual trend in Libya toward nationalist and neutralist policies. Page 7)			OK
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25X1	Iran: Confirm has been appointed who resigned on 4 elements which has quiet demonstration since 2 May. Amin formist program, to which the Shah conservatives, whether interests. So May and is a possible of the same of the	nation by the Shah of report of prime minister to replace May, would indicate an interest called for reform and a cons which have been going of the but his success would depois willing to support him as to would oppose any reform General Bakhtiar also talket is sible choice for prime minimulation of the post reluctant to accept the post	ts that Ali Amini e Sharif-Emami, tent to appease n attempt to on in Tehran a moderate re- end on the extent gainst the ultra- as threatening d to the Shah on nister, but he	25X1 Yro
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The Situation in the Congo

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According to press reports, Tshombé has been advised that he will not be released until he has guaranteed the participation of Katanga deputies in parliament. In April, elements of the Congo Army nominally loyal to Gizenga reportedly agreed to recognize General Mobutu's authority in return for a reconvening of parliament as desired by Gizenga.

Bomboko may regard a reconvening of parliament as the price which Leopoldville must pay to secure Gizenga's participation in negotiations aimed at reuniting the Congo. The American Embassy in Leopoldville reports that Gizenga has "made long strides" in the past three weeks to increase his parliamentary support. Gizenga appears assured of the support of over 40 deputies of the 136-man lower chamber--a bloc comparable to that controlled by Lumumba during his period as premier.

Spaak has to contend with powerful rightist elements in the cabinet which are hostile to any course which might appear to be sacrificing Belgian interests. An aggressive supporter of a vigorous pro-Katanga policy, former Defense Minister Gilson has been retained in the cabinet as minister of interior as a concession to the rightist elements among the Social Christians. Another "flight" of Belgians from the Congo would have grave repercussions on public opinion and seriously weaken Spaak's position as foreign minister.

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	North Korea Seeks Contacts With the South	
25X1	The Seoul University league for national unification which Pyongyang states proposed North-South student talks, claims to have affiliated organizations on a number of South Korean campuses but probably speaks for only a small minority of leftist-inclined students. However, the failure of the "April revolution" of 1960 to provide anticipated economic improvements has increased public interest in reunification as a solution for the country's ills.	
	Aware of this interest, North Korea is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign around the reunification theme. Boasting of its economic progress in the past few years, Pyongyang bombards the South with offers of economic assistance and calls for a wide range of contacts as preliminary steps toward reunification. Pyongyang has sought to make Seoul responsible, in the eyes of the Southern population, for thwarting these overtures.	
	Responsible South Korean government and opposition leaders have been strongly opposed to any form of exchange with the Communists and probably prefer to avoid any initiative on reunification. Last November, however, the Chang Myon government showed some willingness to take a more flexible position toward North-South contacts in order to convince the public it was moving in a reasonable manner to satisfy desires for reunification.	25X1
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Libyan Cabinet Shake-Up

Three of the six new cabinet appointees were drawn from the House of Deputies' Committee on Finance and Economy, the body which would have been most likely to attack the executive branch effectively on the corruption issue. These appointments are presumably a continuation of Uthman's maneuvers to fragment the opposition in the House of Deputies which brought about the fall of the Kubar government last October. The charges then centered on bribes and other irregularities in the government's handling of the costly Fezzan road project. In spite of the past scandal, both he and King Idris are insistent that construction of the Fezzan road be continued by the same Libyan firm and on much the same basis as originally planned.

The government is also extremely vulnerable because of the crudity of the favors granted by top officials in response to bribes from a few of the many Western-owned oil companies operating in Libya. In March, for example, the government unexpectedly opened several concession areas, accepted the applications of two companies which had paved the way with appropriate largesse, and immediately closed the bidding. In a more open and "legal" fashion, federal officials have worked with Libyan provincial governments to obtain large special payments from companies in connection with pipeline rights-of-way. Public resentment has rapidly increased and tends to be directed against the Western oil industry as well as against venal Libyan officials.

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